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dignation and contempt of the medical profession. It should now
stimulate the conscience of the bench and the bar to inspect their
own creation and to acknowledge the intellectual shame of it. Looking over the record of these rulings, in Illinois and elsewhere,
was there ever a sadder spectacle of fatuous futility? Since these
court officials must be conscious that the main purpose of a trial
is to arrive at truth, do they not even for a moment reflect on the
inaptness of this rule for that purpose? Can they sit there and
inscribe these irrational and ignoble logomachies and believe that
the cause of justice is being helped? The rulings have now reached
such a climax of. nonsense that they are almost symptomatic of
some general failing- in the professional intellect that can tolerate them as a part of the daily pabulum. Must we not acknowledge
that they are a disgrace to the profession-nay more, a disgrace
to the human intellect? Will bench and bar never awaken to their
duty of casting away utterly this type of futility?
There is at least a sign of awakening elsewhere, in another
state. In Alabama, where the opinion rule had long ago reached
the acme of irrationality, a bill, supported by a committee of judges
and lawyers, was introduced in this year's legislature, reading as
follows:
"Section 1. Subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this Act, a
conclusion or opinion may always be stated by a lay or non-expert
witness, provided the topic involved in such opinion or conclusion does
not require special experience for drawing or reaching such opinion
or conclusion, and provided the witness is first shown to have had
adequate personal observation of any data from which such opinion or
conclusion might be drawn or reached.
"Sec. 2. Such opinion or conclusion may be stated by the witness
irrespective of whether the data are or are not capable of being so
stated or described by the witness in words or by gestures that the
court or jury, as the case may be, is equally capable of drawing or
reaching the opinion or conclusion; or, irrespective of whether the
data are or are not stated by the witness befor stating his opinion
or conclusion; or, irrespective of whether the opinion or conclusion
involves the very subject of the issue or one of the issues in the case.
"Sec. 3. The trial judge may, in his discretion, disallow or exclude the opinion or conclusion of a lay witness, whenever in his judgment, such testimony is merely cumulative or superfluous.
"Sec. 4. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all courts in
this state."
JOHN H. WIGMORE.
JURISDIcTIoN-BINDING

EFFECT

OF

RULINGS

SUSTAINING

JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON.-[United States] It has been quite
commonly assumed, though the authorities on the point are few,'
that where there has not been such service of process as to give
the court jurisdiction of the person, the defendant might appear
specially and object to the process or service, and in case of adverse
1. For a collection of the cases and a critical discussion of the prob-

lems involved, see Medina "Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction"
(1931) 31 Col. Law Rev. 238.

NOTES

ruling followed by a default, the judgment would be open to the
defense of lack of jurisdiction. Thus in one of the earlier cases,2
Mr. Justice Brewer, in discussing a statute converting a special
appearance into a submission, observed:
"It must be conceded that such statutes contravene the established
rule elsewhere-a rule which also obtained in Texas at an earlier day,
to wit, that an appearance which, as expressed, is solely to challenge
the jurisdiction, is not a general appearance in the case and does not
waive the illegality of the service or submit the party to the jurisdiction
of the court . . . The difference between the present rule in Texas
and elsewhere is simply this: Elsewhere the defendant may obtain the
judgment of the court upon the sufficiency of the service, without submitting himself to its jurisdiction. In Texas, by its statute, if he asks
the court to determine any question, even that of service, he submits
himself wholly to its jurisdiction. Elsewhere he gets an opinion of
the court before deciding his own action. In Texas he takes all the
risk."
The assumption that a ruling sustaining jurisdiction was not
binding is illustrated by a late New York case.3 A suit had been
brought in Rhode Island against the Adams Express Company, and
the process served upon an agent appointed in compliance with a
local statute, but whose appointment had been revoked when the
American Railway Express Co. took over the defendant's business
under the war regulations. The defendant appeared specially to
vacate the service, and, when its objection was overruled, suffered
a judgment by default. The plaintiff then brought suit on this
judgment in New York. A judgment in its favor was affirmed
by the Appellate Division without opinion. The Court of Appeals
apparently took it for granted that the defense of want of jurisdiction in the Rhode Island court was available, and accordingly
held the first judgment void.
The same assumption is tacitly made in the Mix case. 4 There
suit had been brought in a state court of Missouri against a foreign railroad corporation which was not doing business in the state,
and process served on a soliciting freight agent. The defendant
appeared specially and moved to vacate the service. After adverse riling on its motion, the defendant applied to the state Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in the case. The writ was refused without opinion. On .certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment denying prohibition, thus implying that the trial court was
without jurisdiction. Where the question of allowing the defense
of lack of jurisdiction in this class of cases has been discussed, the
courts following this view have reasoned thus: A special appearance to object to the jurisdiction of a court is not a submission, and
if the service of process was legally insufficient to confer jurisdic2. York v. Texas (1890) 137 U. S. 15.
3. Guerin Mills v. Adans Express Co. (1930) 254 N. Y. 380.
4. Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Mix (1929) 278 U. S. 492.
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tion, an erroneous ruling on the question could not give the court
any additional power. 5
On the other hand jurisdiction has been sustained and the defense disallowed on the theory of res judicata, 6 that a special
appearance to object to jurisdiction is at least such a submission
as gives the court power to decide that question, and hence the
decision would be binding until reversed by appellate proceedings.
In the latest case 7 on the subject the Supreme Court of the United
States has adopted the res judicata theory. In that case a suit
had been brought in a state court in Missouri against a foreign
corporation which removed it to the United States District Court.
The defendant then appeared specially and moved to vacate the
service on the ground that the person served was not its agent.
The motion was overruled and a judgment by default entered.
Suit was brought on this judgment in the United States District
Court of Iowa which allowed the defense of want of jurisdiction,
and rendered judgment for the defendant. This was affirmed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals. When the case reached the
Supreme Court, the judgment below was reversed on the following
reasoning:
"The special appearance gives point to the fact that the respondent
entered the Missouri court for the very purpose of litigating the question of jurisdiction over its person. It had the election not to appear
at all. If, in the absence of an appearance, the court had proceeded
to judgment, and the present suit had been brought thereon, respondent
could have raised and tried out the issue in the present action, because
it would never have had its day in court with respect to jurisdiction.
It also had the right to appeal from the decision of the
Missouri District Court, as shown by Harkness v. Hyde; supra, and
the other authorities cited. It elected to follow neither of those courses,
but after having been defeated upon full hearing in its contentions as
to jurisdiction, it took no further steps, and the judgment in question
resulted. Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the results of the
contest; and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled
as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should
not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his
case and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of
fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to
which he has submitted his cause
It seems impossible to reconcile this theory with the result
in the Mix case. According to the reasoning in the Baldwin case
the defendant's voluntary appearance in the state court to object
to its jurisdiction would give the court power to determine that
question, and its adjudication, after full hearing, would be binding,
though erroneous. And if binding, the writ of prohibition was
properly denied by the State Supreme Court, because prohibition
5. Marshall v. R. M. Owen & Co. (1912) 171 Mich. 232.
6. Hall v. Wilson Mfg. Co. (1927) 316 JMo. 812.
7. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n (1931) 51 Sup. Ct. 517.

NOTES

is not a remedy for mere error, and lies only where there is a lack
of jurisdiction. 8
It must be noted, however, that the question of res judicata
was not suggested in the Mix case, and the court and counsel seem
to have proceeded on the assumption that the only question was
whether the service of process gave the trial court jurisdiction.
Under the federal rule, that an exception properly taken to an
adverse ruling on an objection to jurisdiction is not waived 9 by a
subsequent plea in bar and trial on the merits, the policy of applying
the doctrine of res judicata to an adverse ruling on an objection to
jurisdiction appears to be well justified, because the defendant has
ample protection. He need not incur the risk of a failure to appear,
nor the risk of a default after adverse ruling on his objection to
the jurisdiction, since he may defend on the merits without waiving his exception. But in many of the states, a defense on the
merits operates as a waiver of the exception to the adverse ruling
on the objection to jurisdiction. 0
If the res judicata rule is applied in such states, a defendant
is, or may be, placed in a very embarrassing position. For example,
where suit has been brought against a foreign corporation in some
state where it is doubtful whether it was doing business to such
an extent as to subject it to the local jurisdiction, and the claim
is not large enough to enable it to remove the case to the federal
court. If it fails to appear at all it may, of course, make the defense of lack of jurisdiction in any subsequent action on the judgment. But in that event it must risk all on the one more or less
doubtful defense. If it appears specially and objects to the jurisdiction, then in case of an adverse ruling, it cannot stop there because its objection is now res judicata, but it must elect between two
evils. In order to obtain appellate review of the ruling on jurisdiction it must forego any defense on the nierits, because of the
doctrine of waiver. If it elects to defend on the merits in the
objectionable forum, the price is the surrender of all objections
to the jurisdiction. Either of the alternatives seems to give the
plaintiff an undue advantage. If the defendant should stand on the
question of jurisdiction, the plaintiff has got rid of any defense
on the merits; and if the defendant defends on the merits, the
plaintiff has got rid of the jurisdictional objection. If the plaintiff
is defeated on the question of jurisdiction he is free to begin a
new action in the proper forum. If the defendant is defeated
ultimately on the objection to jurisdiction, it has no further chance.
The rule applied in the lower court is helpful to the defendant to
this extent that it risked nothing by special appearance and ob8. In re C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1920) 255 U. S. 273; Ex parte Transportes Maritimes (1924) 264 U. S. 105.
9. Harkness v. Hyde (1878) 98 U. S.
Co. v. Harry (1927) 273 U. S. 119.
10. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hickson
Ry. (1904) 182 Mo. 687. For a discussion
"Preserving a Special Appearance" (1911)

476; James-Dickinson Mortgage
(1902) 197 II1. 117; Newcomb v.
of this problem, see Sunderland
9 Mich. Law Rev. 396.
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jection to the jurisdiction, and that it need not determine its own
course until after ruling on the point.
However, in this group of states objections to jurisdiction of
the person are evidently disfavored, and hence it may be expected
that they will follow the Baldwin case, while adhering to their
own view that a defendant must elect between an exception to the
ruling on jurisdiction and any defense on the merits.
E. W. HINTON.
LICENSES-R2EvOCABILITY--CONTACTS FOR EASEMENTS.-[Illi-

nois] Baird v. Westberg' recalls the discussion that appeared in
the earlier pages of this law review2 where the two outstanding
cases3 on the subject in Illinois were considered at length, and the
1. (1931) 341 Ill. 616.
2. Note in (1914) 9 ILLINoIS LAW REVIEW 281: "It would seem from
these authorities that, once it was clear that a license and nothing more was
given, then the mere fact that the licensee was gullible enough to expend
money or labor in reliance upon the belief that such license would not be
revoked, would not be effectual to ripen such license into an easement. But
it does seem that a right or interest in real estate, which is not revocable
at the will of the owner of the land upon which it is to be enjoyed, may be
had under certain circumstances, even without a deed or instrument in form
to pass real estate. The question is, what are those circumstances? The
answer of the cases, it seems, would be: Where there is a contract for an
easement."
Note in (1918) 13 ILLINOIs LAW REviEw 355: "It was suggeested in
an earlier comment on this question, . . . that the real test upon the
question is the same as that applied to determine whether an oral contract
for the sale or transfer of real property is enforcible. In the case now
under review [Girard v. Lehigh, Stone Co. (1917) 280 I1. 479] the court
would seem to have sustained this position, unless it was the intention of
the court to hold that equity will sustain a parol agreement for an easement
only wheri it can do so negatively, i. e., by denying to one who sought to
interfere with its enjoyment, the aid of equity in sustaining such interference. It is not believed that the court intended to confine its decision to such
narrow compass; at least not if the citation of Kamphouse v. Gaffner [(1874)
73 IIl. 453] was more than inadvertent, for the language there appearing as
above quoted contemplates an affirmative action by a court of equity in
enforcing such an agreement, and not merely a passive action of keeping
hands off.
"If that is true, then the case of Morse v. Lorens 262 Ill. 116, . . .
is overruled by the present case, for in that case the claimant of the rights
under oral agreement brought a bill for injunction, and the court denied the
relief on the ground that a license was revocable despite the ependiture of
money or the making of improvements in reliance thereon. In fact there
is no difference between the two cases in their essential legal aspect, except
that in the present case [Girard v. Lehigh Stone Co.] the relief was sought
by the servient owners to enjoin the enjoyment of the agreement by the
dominant owner, whereas in the case of Morse v. Lorenz the dominant
owner sought to enjoin the interference with such enjoyment. If the court
still adheres to Morse v. Lorenz, then in the present case equity, by keeping
hands off, in effect relegated the parties to a proceeding at law where the
servient owner was bound to prevail. Surely such a result was not contemplated."
3. Morse v. Lorenz (1914) 262 IIl. 115, and Girard v. Lehigh Stone Co.
(1917) 280 Ill. 479.

